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A DEFENSE OF PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION
Simon Pickus
Abstract Public justification is a concept presented by John
Rawls as a way to legitimize political authority and to make
fundamental political arguments. In essence, the principle holds
that one should only present arguments that the opposition can
reasonably accept, as opposed to appealing to a religious or
political conception of the good. This paper seeks to present a
cogent conception of the principle of public justification. The
strengths of the principle will be explained, and the main critiques
of the position will be examined and defended against. By this
method, Rawls‘ conception of public justification can be shown to
be a compelling and robust position.
Among the more pressing issues that have persisted
throughout Western political and philosophical thought have been
how political power can be rightly exercised, and how can political
disputes between passionate parties be fairly resolved. Under what
circumstances can the coercive power of the state be implemented
in a way that is just and right? Bloodlines, military might, and
religious mandates have all been appealed to as justification for
political authority, but these are all answers monarchs and
emperors have given to their already cowed populaces.
Compelling answers to these questions presented by thinkers such
as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau emerged in the form of
reasonable consent of the governed as a legitimizing factor for
18

political authorities. In the 20th century, the widely-read political
philosopher John Rawls best articulated the concept of public
justification, a principle in which political authority can be
considered legitimate only insofar as the reasons given for political
action could be reasonably accepted by those who are governed.
For this project, I will begin by giving a general overview of the
position as conceived and presented by Rawls in his more recent
works. I will follow this outline of public justification by
explaining why this view is appealing and what problems within
political thought it solves, or at least purports to solve. I will then
present brief explanations of some of the more pressing objections
to the theory, and will conclude with a refutation of these critiques.
The Idea of Public Justification
For Rawls, the principle of public justification is one that
exists within what Rawls refers to as a well-ordered society. This
means that, for him, any discussion of public justification
presupposes a democratic society with a political culture that is
pluralistic and has a commonly accepted conception of justice. In
addition, Rawls notes that, ―Accepting this conception does not
presuppose accepting any particular comprehensive doctrine.‖1 To
clarify, ―comprehensive doctrine‖ is a Rawlsian term for a
complete conception of the moral good and a thorough set of
values. Although these are not by necessity comprehensive, what
is important about them is that they comprise a set of values and a
conception of the moral good. Some examples of comprehensive
doctrines are religious beliefs and moral philosophical codes such
1
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as utilitarianism. Here Rawls is emphasizing that the principle of
public justification is distinct from any one conception of the good
or set of moral values. It does not presuppose a religion or ethical
code, and does not need to. As it is meant to function within a
society that has a plurality of comprehensive doctrines that its
citizens accept, public justification is compatible with all
reasonable conceptions of the good.
It is important here to note the particular meaning of
―reasonable‖ in this context, as it is a conceptually significant term.
For Rawls, ―…reasonable persons are ready to propose, or to
acknowledge when proposed by others, the principles needed to
specify what can be seen by all as fair terms of cooperation.‖2 By
this Rawls means that to be reasonable is to act fairly and to seek
cooperation and the resolution of disputes. A reasonable person
will not enter into an agreement knowing that they will later
violate that agreement, not will they staunchly refuse any attempt
at resolving a disagreement. Additionally, reasonable people will
seek to end conflicts and live peaceably, even if doing so is not
always in complete accord with their rational self-interests. Acting
reasonably is, as Rawls sees it, distinct from acting rationally,
although in no way does reasonableness preclude rationality. It is
very possible, however, to act rationally and unreasonably at the
same time. An example of this would be a person who enters a
long-term agreement and immediately forsakes that agreement
when they see a way to derive some advantage from it. Another
way to conceptualize this distinction is in the context of rational
self-interest. To act in accord with rational self-interest is always
2
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rational but not always reasonable. The example of the tragedy of
commons demonstrates that rational self interest leads to what
Rawls would call unreasonable behavior, because it does not
indicate a desire for fair cooperation. Rawls‘ conception of the
reasonable, I find, agrees in large part with commonly held
intuitions of what it is to act reasonably.
The principle of public justification, once established in the
Rawlsian political context, is the vehicle for those with political
disagreements to discuss and resolve their disputes in ways that are
reasonable and acceptable to all involved. As Rawls explains, this
principle allows people and groups to ―…justify to one another
their political judgments: each cooperates, politically and socially,
with the rest on terms all can endorse as just. This is the meaning
of public justification.‖3 Here Rawls explains the very basic idea
of the public justification principle.
People within a well-ordered society, or any developed
democratic society as we would recognize today, will inevitably
disagree with each other and their leaders on their political and
social policy judgments. This alone is difficult to dispute. There
are many reasons, even within a well-ordered society with a shared
conception of justice, for these disagreements, such as what Rawls
refers to as the plurality of comprehensive doctrines. He claims
that, ―…a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable yet reasonable
comprehensive doctrines will come about and persist…This fact
about free societies is what I call the fact of reasonable pluralism.‖4
Once the aforementioned disputes arise, public justification acts as
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a mechanism for their resolution. People and groups justify their
political judgments by presenting arguments that their opponents
can reasonably endorse as a means of making their views plausible
within the worldviews of the other. Using public justification, they
appeal not to their conception of the good, such as, for example,
the principle of utility or the intrinsic value and dignity of a human
being, but rather they appeal to political values and reasons they
both share so as to cooperatively come to a conclusion. In this way
political disputes can, ideally, be solved in such that all can
reasonably accept the conclusion without having to violate their
closely held values and beliefs. Rawls goes on to note that,
―Public justification proceeds from some consensus: from premises
all parties in disagreement, assumed to be free and equal and fully
capable of reason, may reasonably be expected to endorse.‖5
The general aim of this principle, then, is to provide a way
for political judgments to be justified without appeal to reasons
that the disagreeing party would never accept. A utilitarian could
never convince a Kantian that a political moral dilemma can be
solved using the principle of utility, no more than an Orthodox Jew
could appeal to his or her religious tenets to convince a political
opponent who is an adherent of Islam. No matter how dearly
someone holds their conception of the moral good, they will not be
able to offer compelling arguments to me if I do not agree with that
idea of the good. They would need to find a set of criteria we both
accept. By avoiding argument entrenched in the values of a
comprehensive doctrine, public justification aims to avoid some of
the persistent and pressing disagreements that have plagued
I
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political discourse. Additionally, it reinforces political cooperation
and reasonable discourse in a way that is consistent with a
functioning democracy.
One important distinction that Rawls emphasizes is that
public justification does not have a basis in simple agreement.
What sets public justification aside as unique is its appeal to a
common ground of reasonable arguments based, in part, on a
shared conception of justice that allows for important political
disputes to be fairly solved. Rawls himself states that, ―It is this
last condition of reasoned reflection that, among other things,
distinguishes public justification from mere agreement.‖6 Here
Rawls shows the true importance of justifying political positions
by presenting reasons anyone could reasonably accept. It is this
aspect of public justification that sets it apart and, as I will now
explain, it is this aspect that makes the principle of public
justification appealing.
Why Public Justification is Compelling
The theory of public justification has a variety of strengths
that make it a very compelling way to approach political discourse
and legitimacy. The first largely intuitive main strength of public
justification is that it serves as an alternative to tyranny and
oppression, and as construed here does not allow for tyranny or
oppression of any sort. The very nature of public justification does
not allow for any sort totalitarian coercive rule that is imposed on
the populace of a nation unwillingly. This aspect of public
justification, though simple and straightforward, is a significant
6
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point in its favor.
A second way in which the principle of public justification
is strongly compelling is that it provides a way to solve political
disputes that otherwise seem too divisive or too deeply entrenched
in moral values for either party to possibly accept the other‘s
position. This is particularly relevant to American politics, and
similar systems, in which there is a political culture of such
profoundly divided adversarial fervor that a resolution between the
adversaries, in this case the two political parties, seems completely
unfeasible. Joshua Cohen, a prominent contemporary political
philosopher, echoes this sentiment when he notes, ―The more
immediate concerns come from the pathologically polarized state
of political discourse in the United States.‖7 He goes on to state
that the intention of politics is to confront and overcome important
and pressing issues relating to people and what they value in their
lives, which is significant because ―…public reason arguably
provides a more promising basis than polarized disagreement for
doing the works of politics, and…decent and inclusive political life
is not only a profoundly important good, but a painfully fragile
one.‖8 In essence, the principle of public justification allows us to
do the important work of politics without being hobbled by the
vehement political culture that currently exists in the U.S. All that
is required for this to work is that those engaged in political
arguments accept that giving conceptions of the good as criteria for
political decisions is not only unreasonable but disrespectful, as it
is essentially a demand that political opponents defer to one‘s
7
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comprehensive doctrine. Were politicians and pundits to accept
this burden of respect and consider the practical advantages of
public justification, we would not be stuck in such a partisan rut.
In this case, public justification is compelling in that it avoids this
issue by leading the disputing parties to converse using reasons
that the other side might reasonably accept. At the very least, this
principle presents the possibility of progress beyond the partisan
impasse that some see the United States to be stuck in, and in this
way public justification is compelling to American political
thinkers.
A third reason that public justification is appealing lies in
the distinction between rational and reasonable. As a method for
justifying political positions and authority, public justification as
presented by Rawls prioritizes the reasonable over the rational. To
some, the appeal to discussion between reasonable people without
emphasizing acting in strictly rational ways lies in the avoidance of
prisoner‘s dilemma-type situations. By this I mean that for some,
political discourse is problematic because it can be said to be
populated by those who act strictly in their own interests and the
interests of their associates; people who act in ruthlessly
calculating ways. Public justification, on the other hand, ensures
political discourse in which nobody is trying to trick their
opponents, but rather encourages reasonable people to make
genuinely persuasive arguments so as arrive at resolutions of
political disputes. This emphasis on reasonableness is appealing to
some because it presents a less adversarial, more cooperative
method of dealing with political disagreements. As an
environment focused on the genuine resolution of the issues in
reasonable and productive ways, public justification is an
25

appealing principle.
A fourth strength of public justification is the way in which
it provides a means for the maintenance of both legitimacy and
stability in contractarian societies, those societies with a basis in
some sort of founding agreement or governing document. A very
real issue for these societies is that in several generations that
society will be comprised of citizens who were not party to the
original contractarian agreement. In a Hobbesian society, for
example, once this point is reached, and there is no effective
institutional way to change the society, then it is only a matter of
time until circumstances change such that sufficient people reject
the original contractarian agreement and the foundations of the
society collapse. For this reason, there will come a point at which
the members of the society no longer see a compelling reason to
continue to submit to the coercive powers of the state granted by
their ancestors. Public justification becomes appealing in this
circumstance because it provides a plausible means for the
contractarian society to change according to the wills of its citizens
without a fundamental threat to its stability. Since the society‘s
basic institutions are now mutable according to the will of the
current populace, general discontent with the contractarian nature
of the state is no longer an issue. In this way public justification is
a compelling principle to those who adhere to contractarian
conceptions of statehood.
Objection 1: Begs the Question
In addition to its many compelling features, the principle of
public justification has significant objections to contend with. To
begin, it is necessary to clarify the concept of public reason and its
26

interaction with public justification. As Rawls puts it, public
reasons are, ―…the political values covered by the political
conception of justice (or one of a suitable family of such).‖9 In
essence, public reasons are those we can give to justify our actions
and positions to others within our society who therefore share our
basic political conceptions. As Cohen puts it, ―…the ideal of
public reason says that in our political affairs…justification ought
to be conducted on common ground…common ground provided
by considerations that participants in the political relations can all
acknowledge as reasons.‖10 Simply put, public reason is the
vehicle of public justification; reasons that are publicly justifiable
are discussed using public reason. It is the form of reason we use
to justify our political judgments to others. In this sense a
discussion of public reason goes hand-in-hand with one of public
justification, and a rejection of public reason is a rejection of
public justification.
The first objection I will address comes from a writer
named Bruce Brower of Tulane University. In his article The
Limits of Public Reason, Brower analyzes several ways in which
Rawls can make public reason, and by extension public
justification, compelling to those who do not accept the priority of
the reasonable. If I can refute any one of these, it would show that
Rawls‘ project does not succumb to the limitations Brower
presents. I am choosing to address one of these lines of argument,
in which Brower claims that the demands of public reason violate
equal respect and can be shown to be compelling only to those that
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already accept the ideal of the reasonable. In other words, Brower
argues that the case for public reason begs the question. Brower
argues that the demands of public justification violate equal respect
because they require people to abandon values and beliefs that are
deeply important to them. As he writes, ―Treating others equally
and acting autonomously…requires us to ignore an important part
of our character…‖11 Here Brower is arguing that in requiring that
people not use their conception of the good to make fundamental
political decisions Rawls is asking them to forsake something too
important to simply discard. Brower goes on to argue that
proponents of public justification, ―…do ignore something
‗constitutive‘ of our persons: that we care deeply about our
conceptions of the good and associated justifications…The
problem is…Rawlsian arguments will be acceptable only to those
who have already approved the…ideal of the reasonable person.‖12
This is the meat of the objection that Brower presents. Rawls fails
to show equal respect because he devalues peoples‘ constitutive
values on the grounds that they are not publicly acceptable reasons
to give in a political sense. Because of this, Brower feels that
Rawls is saying that people should not give morally-grounded
justifications, and should rather give public justifications, which
are more reasonable. But, Brower claims, this requires that
someone has already accepted the priority of the reasonable.
Because of this, public justification is only compelling to those
who already accept it.
This objection is not as strong as it first appears, and it in
11
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fact undermines itself. There are two primary claims to deal with:
the demands of public justification violate equal respect, and
public justification is not compelling to those who have not already
accepted it. A fair way to analyze this objection is to consider a
political dialogue between two people and look to see if the issues
Brower presented indeed occur. Abe is someone who wants to
make political arguments based on his conception of the moral
good. Zeke is a proponent of public justification. He adheres to a
comprehensive doctrine but does not seek to ground political
arguments in the values of that doctrine. Abe claims that society
should implement policy A because it is consistent with his
comprehensive doctrine‘s view of the moral good. Zeke says that
that conception of the good conflicts with his own, and as such he
cannot reasonably accept Abe‘s justification. Zeke suggests that
Abe appeal to shared aspects of their society‘s political culture.
Abe responds by saying that it is disrespectful that he be asked to
discard his comprehensive doctrine, which is very important to
him, when making this important political argument. This is the
point Brower gets at. My response is to ask what, then, is the
alternative? It seems as though the only way out of this impasse
for Abe is that Zeke accept his conception of the good and
therefore his political argument. But this undermines any attempt
at equal respect that Brower wants to make. If this is what
comprises equal respect, then Abe‘s demand of Zeke is no less
disrespectful than Zeke‘s demand. For people who value
conceptions of the good and their importance as much as Brower
does, it follows that they would then find it unfair to ask someone
else to defer to their conception of the good, as that would be
demanding that they disregard a personally constitutive value.
29

I respond that Brower‘s standard for equal respect is too
high to be feasible, and that it will inevitably lead to the impasse
mentioned above. Given the aforementioned fact of reasonable
pluralism, which I take to be uncontroversial in a free society, this
impasse will occur constantly. Public justification is compelling
precisely because it is a mechanism for this plurality of doctrines
to exist without anyone having to defer to another‘s conception of
the moral good. A more proper standard for equal respect is to
consider each comprehensive doctrine to be as valuable as any
other. This standard of respect, together with the fact of reasonable
pluralism, leads us to conclude that those who hold conceptions of
the good to be vitally important to people would in fact find a
reason to endorse public justification. It provides a mechanism for
political cooperation while maintaining everyone‘s deeply
important values and ensuring that the standard of equal respect is
not violated. This conclusion in addition to the strengths of public
justification I mentioned earlier provides a very strong basis for the
acceptance of public justification by those who do not necessarily
endorse Rawls‘ ideal of the reasonable.
Objection 2: Self-Defeating
The second objection to the theory of public justification I
will address is presented by Steven Wall in his article, Is Public
Justification Self-Defeating?. Wall argues that public justification
is in need of justification, and is unable to satisfactorily meet its
own demands to justify itself to those who it would apply to. In
other words, Wall is arguing that public justification is not in itself
sufficiently publicly justifiable to justify itself as a principle for
determining the legitimacy of political authority. Wall begins his
30

argument by defining public justification in a way that is coherent
and continuous with the way it has been defined here. He claims
that among the relevant requirements for political authority to be
publicly justifiable is what he calls the ―acceptability requirement.‖
Wall defines this by saying, ―…the justification must be one that
can be reasonably accepted (or not reasonably rejected) by those to
whom it is addressed.‖13 There is nothing problematic here. He
goes on to discuss how we must make a distinction between a
public justification and a correctness-based justification. For Wall,
a correctness-based justification is one that demonstrates that a
conclusion is correct, whereas public justification, something that
has already been made clear, is distinct from this. This is
significant for Wall because if proponents of public justification do
not hold that political authority must be legitimized by both of the
aforementioned justifications, then they are left to answer why
public justification is even worth discussing. Wall continues by
explaining that this can be resolved by claiming that public
justification serves to mark the outer limits of our freedom14, and
as such leads to what Wall calls the ―reconciling function‖ of
public justification, which serves to show that each person has a
good reason, by appealing to public justification, to accept political
authority. This function demonstrates why a correctness-based
justification is not inherently sufficient for legitimizing political
authority.
Wall argues that despite the appeal of the reconciling
feature of public justification, it is still not an inherently correct
13
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theory of political legitimacy. This, Wall explains, ―…is why it is
reasonable to say that [public justification] stands in need of
justification.‖15 In other words, since public justification does not
claim to be correct on moral grounds, it needs to be justified by
other means. So, Wall asks, what sort of justification is required?
The answer is that public justification must satisfy its own
requirements, and for this reason the theory might be selfdefeating. As Wall puts it, ―If [public justification] were indeed a
self-defeating principle, then it would fail on its own terms. This
would give us a reason to reject it.‖16 Wall proceeds by claiming
that supporters of public justification must now either demonstrate
that public justification does not apply to itself, or that it does in
fact meet its own demands. Wall addresses the first claim and
argues that it is untenable because it contradicts the very purpose
of public justification. To claim that public justification does not
need to meet its own demands would be to say that any given
authority is publicly justifiable but then not offer a reason to accept
the constraints of public justifiability. This does not get us
anywhere.
Wall addresses the second claim against the self-defeat of
public justification in two ways. In the first, Wall argues that any
attempt to argue that public justification applies to itself because of
values that permeate contemporary democratic societies would
have to contend with the objection that the principle of equal
respect is in fact not embedded in modern democratic societies.
This results in there being at least some people in contemporary
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society who would not reasonably accept the theory of public
justification. Secondly, Wall discusses how even if there did exist
some sort of background political value that all members of a
society shared, people would disagree as to the particular nature of
that value. In this case there would be so much disagreement
about the shared value that the value would be too thin a concept to
appeal to when giving public reasons.
Wall concludes his discussion of public justification by
expressing doubt that there is any recourse for those who support
public justification to prove that it in fact is not self-defeating.
Additionally, he notes, political legitimacy might be a matter of
degree, and that public justification still serves to legitimize
political authority better than any alternatives. He concludes by
claiming that given that even if these might be valid options for the
proponent of public justification, they do not refute the overall
claim that public justification is self-defeating.
To begin my response to this objection, I note that Wall
seems to give a charitable presentation of the general principle of
public justification. I will also concede here that since public
justification is not a correctness-based justification, it does need to
be justified further. I will here accept the claim that in order to
avoid being self-defeating, public justification must either be said
to not apply to itself, or must itself be publicly justifiable. I will
refute this objection by showing that public justification is itself
publicly justifiable. This is because, despite Wall‘s insistence to
the contrary, there is indeed a commonly held political conception
of justice in contemporary democratic societies, and it is that
conception of justice that can be appealed to in order to justify the
theory of public justification, as well as other political claims.
33

Although there are considerable disagreements when it comes to
moral conceptions of justice, such as how to punish criminals and
what moral codes people ought to abide by, when it comes to
political discourse Americans still share fundamental intuition
about what political justice is. By this I mean our political culture
holds that taxation without representation, for example, is unfair
and unjust in a political sense. Americans expect the will of the
people and the spirit of the constitution to be enforced as matters of
justice and would as a group reject a leader or proposal that
violates the basic tenets of democracy and representation. We have
an understanding of society as what Rawls calls ―…a fair system
of social cooperation over time from one generation to the next.‖17
We have a sense of basic liberties as defined by our constitution.
This commonly-held conception of justice, broadly defined,
functions as a baseline that publicly justifiable arguments can
appeal to. In other words, this shared conception of political
justice in American political culture is a common ground that
demonstrates that the principle of public justification can be
applied to the United States. I am confident that such shared
conceptions of justice exist in similarly democratic nations.
Here it is important again to note the distinction between
agreement and a shared political conception of justice. People
agree when for whatever reason they both find an argument or idea
appealing. A common conception of political justice, however,
goes beyond agreement because it is a fundamental aspect of the
democratic political culture that members of a free society share.
They share it not because it is in accord with their conceptions of
17
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the moral good, but because it is part of the political culture they
belong to. People who disagree on political and moral matters may
still appeal to this shared political value and offer compelling
arguments (i.e. public reasons) to each other. It is from these
public reasons that people may come to an agreement about
political decisions or policies. Because of this common ground I,
or anyone else, can offer arguments in political disputes that are
reasonable for my opponent to accept on the basis of political
justice.
Wall also argues that even were a shared political value to
exist within a society, ―…it does not follow that everyone has
reason to accept the particular interpretation of this principle that is
needed to ground [public justification].‖18 I contend that even
given differing interpretations of this value, the fundamental core
of the value, such as justice, would suffice for the purposes of
public justification. Additionally, Rawls himself addresses this
concern in his presentation of the idea of an overlapping
consensus, wherein he echoes my claim. As he writes,
―While…all citizens affirm the same political conception of
justice, we do not assume they do so for all the same reasons…but
this does not prevent the political conception from being a shared
point of view from which they can resolve questions concerning
the constitutional essentials.‖19 As a result, public justification is in
fact not self defeating because it can meet its own demands, and it
can be shown that modern democratic societies do have sufficient
shared political values for public reasons to be feasibly presented.

18
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Conclusion
The principle of public justification, that political authority
is legitimized and political disputes resolved by both parties
appealing to arguments that the other side can reasonably accept, is
to me a powerful principle. Because it is not limited by
conceptions of the moral good and because it can help us to escape
the partisan rut we as Americans seem to be stuck in, public
justification can act as a means to end long standing and seemingly
irresolvable political disputes. In addition, the emphasis of the
reasonable over the rational ensures we avoid the pitfalls of
unrelenting rational self-interest, such as those presented in the
prisoner‘s dilemma and the tragedy of the commons. Although
objections are leveled against the theory, they are not sufficiently
strong to dissuade us from accepting public justification and its
advantages in terms of fairness, respect, and pragmatism. In the
end, public justification remains the most reasonable and
compelling method for adequately resolving political disputes and
legitimizing political authority. I genuinely believe that this
principle is the best way to overcome the obstacles of political
oppression and divisiveness, in spite of people‘s desires to adhere
only to their conceptions of the good. Were just Americans to
accept this principle, the contemporary political climate would
improve tenfold, and much more genuine progress could be made.
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